Land lease programs for urban food production (adapted from MacRae et al., 2012)
Although community gardening is happening primarily on public or para-public land, there are often significant opportunities to engage a wider range of institutional actors and private firms, given their often significant land holders, often in traditional lawns. Urban farmers also often do not own the land they cultivate. There can be worries, however, about gardening practices, security, water, liability and who has access to the site. Such matters can be addressed by municipal facilitation that links land with gardeners, and provides a lease template.
Setting lease rates at zero is obviously optimal for self-provisioning, but not necessarily realistic in urban areas with high land costs and significant competition for building sites. Landowners may have motives other than maximizing profit for offering land at reduced rate. They may want to see food production next to their residence, to support local residents, to gain environmental benefits (birds, bees, etc.), or to obtain a tax break by making land available to nonprofit or public groups. If the city creates incentives for developers to install food production sites (potentially as part of Community Benefit provisions, see Goal 1 Food retail access), and disincentives if they fail to. Rates are very complex when having to determine “fair market value” for land with a limited set of private uses (e.g., hydroelectric corridors).
Given the complexities in larger municipalities with significant land use pressures, a coordinated leasing system will be needed. Interested landowners, including the municipal government and para-public institutions, could contract with a third-party organization to manage lease arrangements based on templates established by the municipality. The third party would set up the lease arrangements with interested farmers and community groups, taking a small percentage of rents supplemented with revenues from the municipality and foundations to finance its coordination activities. If a third party is managing leases, there is some opportunity for pooled leasing rates for farmers and community organizations, with the leasing agency pooling revenue and then dispersing it differentially to landowners. In this way, commercial activities can subsidize self-provisioning.
Changes to hunting, trapping and fishing licenses
Licenses are primarily regulated by the provinces, except for indigenous peoples who are regulated by both federal and provincial rules. Provincial rules are further broken done by regional zones, seasons and species. Firearms rules are primarily provincially regulated, except that the federal government has been working on gun registries.
Building on existing rules that give preference to aboriginal rights after conservation goals are met and before other allocations (for example, see Ontario rules about fishing licences), and given significant declines in wildlife and plants in traditional indigenous provisioning territories, indigenous peoples will have to be further preferenced for hunting, fishing, trapping and harvesting on those areas. Recreational licenses for non-indigenous peoples (including those attached to recreational hunting lodges) will have to be limited to protect resources. This also means making much fuller use of traditional ecological knowledge for determining how many tags and licenses will be available to recreational hunters and fishers. Beaudin - Reimer (2020) highlights in one case the disparity between a Métis view of the moose population in a region and the provincial one, with the Métis hunter lamenting the inaccuracy of the provincial approach to determining how many moose tags to permit believing that it contributes to population decline. In some cases, Métis hunters have called for a region to be closed for lack of moose and the province has ignored their calls because it hasn't done a survey to confirm. Acceptable traps and firearm permits.
For tags and licenses distributed to non-indigenous people, the priority should be those for whom self-provisioning is an important part of the family's food security, identified as about 25% of hunters, but a much smaller percentage of fishers. Certainly catch and release programs restrict access (see Goal 5, Sustainable Fishery Management). For trappers, those trapping for income and self-provisioning would be the priority. A challenge will be designing a test to determine who is a self-provisioning priority. Those on unemployment, social assistance or pensions are readily identifiable, more difficult is identifying the working poor. However, changes to income security architecture (see Goal 1) will improve the circumstances of the working poor, which would allow those on fixed low incomes to be the priority. Non-Canadians with tourist outfitter establishments will be the lowest priority, not because of their national status, but because they have to have considerable income to afford such a trip.
In some cases, conservation organizations receive some of their funding from licenses, so if there is a significant decline in the numbers issued, that may compromise conservation budgets. Governments would need to monitor these realities and provide compensatory revenues to assure conservation work isn't compromised.
Land-based pedagogical approaches in educational settings
Governance strategies for urban food production (adapted from MacRae et al., 2012)
In most cities, urban food production is happening in a somewhat un-co-ordinated fashion. Governmental and non-governmental actors support projects, different funders offer supports, access to land can be a difficult process, and spatial dispersal uneven. In the spirit of creating a more co-ordinated approach for both self-provisioning and commercial production, MacRae et al. (2012) and Nasr et al. (2010) set out mechanisms in Toronto for governing urban food production. Although these proposals have had some influence on the construction of Toronto's Agricultural Strategy, little of their governance proposals has been implemented.
Complex policy and program environments, such as those related to urban food production, are challenging to govern. A structure and process must aggregate resources for implementing food production across numerous complementary and competing actions and actors. Gaps in jurisdictional and regulatory frameworks can create governance challenges. The range of landowners and building owners and the geographic dispersion of production and distribution further complicate the
Several models are possible (see Nasr et al. 2010), but the approach most consistent with Goal 7 is a multistakeholder steering body with staffing from a funded agency. It is modeled on the Student Nutrition Toronto Partnership, which coordinates the implementation of student nutrition programs for over 125,000 children daily in Toronto schools (see Goal 3, Integrating food into educational processes). In this model, overall governance and policy development would be provided by a steering body representing all the main governmental and nongovernmental actors engaged in the sector. Staffing support would be provided by municipal staff already supporting urban food production. The steering body would have an allocations committee that aggregates resources — land, finances, inputs, expertise — and distributes them to projects based on one funding application. The allocation committee’s members would include representatives from government, funding agencies, private donors, and program delivery agencies.
Co-management agreements for habitat and country food
Protecting indigenous foodscapes (Curran, 2019)